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A Penal Colony for Bad Lawyers
by Bennett L. Gershman*
Consider the following cases:
Larry Heath's court-appointed lawyer's appellate brief contained only
a single page of argument, raised only a single issue, and cited only a
single legal precedent. Heath was executed in 1992.1
Herbert Lee Richardson's appellate brief failed to mention that the
prosecutor argued at Richardson's sentencing hearing (without any basis
in the record but with no objection by defense counsel) that Richardson
should be sentenced to death because he belonged to a black Muslim
organization in New York, had killed a woman in New Jersey, and had
been dishonorably discharged from the military. Richardson's lawyer was
later disbarred for other reasons. Richardson was executed in 1989.2
Arthur Jones was represented at trial by a court-appointed lawyer who
made no opening or closing statement and offered no evidence at the
penalty phase. During the post-conviction phase, he was represented by
a sole practitioner just two years out of law school who had never handled
a capital case. Jones was executed in 1986.3
Horace Dunkins, an intellectually disabled black man, "was
represented by a lawyer so incompetent that the jury was never told that
Dunkins was mentally retarded. Dunkins had an IQ of 65 and the mental
age of a 10 to 12 year old child." Dunkins was executed in 1989.4
Professor, Pace Law School. Princeton University (B.A., 1963); New York University
School of Law (J.D., 1966).
1. Confirmation Hearingson Fed. Appointments, Comm. on the Judiciary, 102 Cong.,
106, 122 (1992) (statement of Stephen B. Bright, Director, Southern Center for Human
Rights).

2. Id.
3. Id. at 122-23.
4. Id. at 123.

743

744

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

"The capital trial of a battered woman was interrupted for a day when
her defense counsel appeared in court so intoxicated that he was held in
contempt and sent to jail for the day and night."5
A defense lawyer requested an adjournment between the guilt phase
and penalty phase of a murder trial so that he could read the state's death
penalty statute.6
"A lawyer's brief was sent back to him by the appellate court ...
because it did not cite a single case." 7
A capital defendant was visited only once by his lawyer in eight years.
In another case, the lawyer never visited his client in eight years.8
What should happen to these lawyers? Should they be disbarred,
suspended, or retrained? I thought about these cases after I learned that
"disruptive innovations" in criminal defense was going to be the topic of
a panel discussion last August at the annual conference of the
Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS). For anyone interested
in criminal procedure, it is certainly a provocative topic. It invites
reflection on the quality of criminal defense lawyers, and as the examples
above suggest, the consequences of seriously deficient lawyering. The
examples above plainly are not run-of-the-mill mistakes or even
negligent departures from conventional norms of defense lawyering. The
examples-and there are numerous other similar examples-describe
professional representation so egregious that imposing the most
draconian sanctions on these lawyers would seem appropriate, even
desirable.
The concept of "disruptive innovation" is vague. Imagining the idea of
lawyer "disruption" might conjure a scene from Al Pacino's aggressive
role in the 1979 film And Justice for All 9 or embody the tradition of
lawyers courageously representing unpopular clients, sometimes placing
their lives at risk in courtrooms and on streets. But the panel, I
discovered, was more interested in the concept of disruption as
descriptive of radical departures from conventional lawyering and
conventional discipline.

5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id. (emphasis in original).
8. Id. at 124.
9. AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Columbia Pictures 1979).
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Disruption presumably can happen in numerous ways. Bruce Green,
the distinguished ethicist, proposes disruption by having two lawyers
defend a client instead of one.' 0 But, as any mathematician knows, two
times zero equals zero. My proposal, I confess, is not nearly as informed
as the Green proposal and indeed, may be so farfetched as to invite
ridicule.
Still, I will persevere and set out what I believe is an extreme and
unconventional way to discipline egregiously bad lawyers. For starters, I
think it might be useful to survey briefly the kinds of lawyering conduct
currently subject to disciplinary sanctions. Regulation of the conduct of
defense lawyers in the U.S. is hedged by various legal and professional
rules that are enforced by courts and disciplinary bodies essentially to
ensure a minimum level of competent and ethical representation." The
Sixth Amendment 2 right to counsel-the so-called "sacred" right-seeks
to ensure at least a reasonable degree of lawyering skill.' 3 Also,
professional codes seek to ensure zealous and meaningful representation.
Nevertheless, these standards are very broad, and bad lawyering often
escapes sanctions or even notice.
Ironically, although bad defense lawyering, in my opinion, happens at
least as often as bad prosecuting, the latter appears to have elicited more
criticism by the media and the academic community. Why this disparate
treatment of prosecutors and defense lawyers? It is a curious dichotomy,
especially since bad lawyering by defense attorneys, as documented in
many studies, accounts for at least as many miscarriages of justice as
misconduct by prosecutors.1 4 To be sure, just as most prosecutors behave
fairly and professionally, so do most defense lawyers represent their
clients with skill and dedication. But, just as some prosecutors behave
dishonorably, some defense lawyers behave incompetently. However, bad
prosecutors are excoriated; bad defense lawyers are marginalized or
ignored.
Recently, as I walked along the narrow cobblestoned streets of
Prague-the same streets that Franz Kafka traversed while he was
consumed by thoughts of law, courts, trials,, and punishment-I
10. See Bruce Green, The Right to Two Criminal Defense Lawyers, 69 MERCER L. REV.
675 (2018).
11. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
13. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (reasoning that the Constitution
invests the Sixth Amendment right to counsel with a "peculiar sacredness").
14. See James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Capital Attrition: Error
Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000) (noting that
"egregiously incompetent defense lawyering" accounted for 37% of errors in capital cases
compared to a 16% error rate based on prosecutorial misconduct).
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wondered how he might approach the subject of disruptive innovations
in defense lawyering. Kafka's most prominent take on defense lawyering
appears in his classic novel The Trial,15 in which Joseph K. is charged by
an unspecified agency with an unspecified crime.16 The courtroom is a
shabby, airless attic of a tenement.17 K.'s lawyer, obtained through his
uncle, describes the so-called system of justice: guilt is assumed, the
bureaucracy is vast and secretive, the rules are secret, and so are the
identities of the judges.18 The lawyer advises K. of his dire situation,
brags about the lawyer's connections, and explains his futile efforts to
help many of his other hopeless clients. 19 K. is scared about his upcoming
trial, but after learning how his lawyer oppressed a former client, he
decides to dismiss him and take matters into his own hands. 20
Kafka didn't like the lawyer. 21 I imagine, most presumptuously for
sure, that if Kafka had participated in the SEALS conference in Boca
Raton, Florida, and had thought about disruptive innovations to punish
bad lawyers, he might have imagined the idea of sending them to his
notorious detention facility featured in his famous short story, In the
Penal Colony22 -also the subject of a fine law review article 23 by my
colleague, Michael Mushlin. Given Kafka's dark, depressing view of the
justice system, and his revulsion for the defense lawyer who represents
Joseph K., it is entirely possible Kafka might have employed his "torture
machine" as a disruptive innovative device to deal with the miserable
performance of bad lawyers generally. Indeed, the quasi-religious
epiphany that condemned persons experienced in Kafka's penal colony
struck me as exactly the kind of mystical renewal that Kafka might have
envisaged for bad lawyers.
Thus was born the idea-borrowed loosely from Kafka-of a "Penal
Colony" as a disruptive innovation to improve the quality of American
lawyers and punish the bad ones.

15. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Breon Mitchell trans., 1998).
16. See id. at 111.
17. Id. at 114.
18. Id. at 113-18, 125.
19. Id. at 112, 123.
20. Id. at 166.
21. See id.
22. See FRANz KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in SELECTED STORIES 90-128 (Modern
Library 1952).
23. Michael B. Mushlin, "IAm Opposed to This Procedure" How Franz Kafka's In The
Penal Colony Illuminates the Current Debate About Solitary Confinement and Oversight of
American Prisons, 93 OR. L. REV. 571 (2015).
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I. AN EPIDEMIC OF BAD LAWYERS
Prosecutorial misconduct has been discussed and diagnosed with
increasing passion and prescription. Indeed, one judge has characterized
the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct, at least respecting the
suppression of exculpatory evidence, as an "epidemic." 24 But critics have
not assailed with equal vigor the quality of defense lawyering. To be sure,
the quality of defense lawyering varies widely. Institutional defenders,
in my opinion, generally provide highly competent representation. Any
diminution of the quality of their representation is attributable mostly to
lack of funds, high volume of cases, and sometimes limited training and
supervision. 25 By contrast, representation by the private bar, whether by
retention or assignment, is often so substandard as to constitute one of
the most serious malfunctions in the criminal justice system.
The data is damning. Judicial decisions are replete with instances of
inexplicably bad lawyering. 26 What makes the deficient conduct of these
lawyers even more troublesome is the extent to which courts go out of
their way to minimize or marginalize lawyer incompetence so as to
render claims of ineffectiveness much more difficult to sustain. Courts
have been instructed to assess the reasonableness of counsel's
performance in a highly deferential manner. 27 We are told, given the
imponderables and uncertainties of jury trial advocacy in general, courts
"must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." 28 To be sure, a
lawyer can almost always do something different in every case and does

24. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013).
25. Alexa Van Brunt, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who Are Too Overworked
to Defend Them, The GUARDIAN, June 17, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/commentis
free/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-overworked; Laurence A. Benner, Eliminating Excessive Public Defender Workloads, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011), https://www.amer
icanbar.org/content/damlaba/publications/criminaljustice-magazine/cjsullbenner.authc
heckdam.pdf.
26.

See JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

(2017 ed.); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL ERROR AND CONDUCT §§ 3-3, 3-4, 3-5
(3d ed. 2017).
27. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ("Judicial scrutiny of
counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to
second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy
for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that
a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.").
28. See id.; Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994) ("The truth is that it is
often hard for even a good lawyer to know what to do. Trying cases is no exact science. And,
as a result, we must never delude ourselves that the fair review of a trial lawyer's judgment
and performance is an activity that allows for great precision or for a categorical
approach.").
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not enjoy the benefit of unlimited time, energy, or financial resources.
Courts, therefore, make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct,
and evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time of the
trial. 29

Moreover, this judicial deference to arguably very bad lawyering is
enhanced by the way the courts recognize and accept the role of trial
strategy in counsel's decision-making. Trial lawyers indisputably make
numerous strategic decisions in representing an accused. These decisions
range from determining what matters to investigate; what theories to
pursue; which witnesses to call; what evidence to present; what
approaches to employ in challenging the prosecution's case; what
approaches to use in examining and cross-examining witnesses; when to
object to evidence and argument and when not to object; and what
arguments to make to the jury.30 Courts have been cautioned not to
second-guess counsel's efforts, particularly when counsel's decision
results from a strategic choice made after careful investigation and
deliberation.3 1 These decisions are virtually unchallengeable. 32 In fact,
strategic decisions made after less-than-complete investigation are seen
as reasonable to the extent that reasonable professional judgment
supports the limited investigation. 33
Thus, claims of trial strategy are rarely second-guessed by appellate
courts. 34 However, such claims may be discounted when they appear to
be self-serving justifications made after the fact and are strongly
contradicted by the record. 35 This is particularly the case when the
lawyer lacks sufficient knowledge of the legal or factual basis necessary
to effectively raise the claim, for example, by not understanding the
obviously exculpatory potential of semen evidence in a sexual assault

29. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
30. See Adam Liptak, Facing the Death Penalty With a Disloyal Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/us/politics/death-penalty-supremecourt-attorney.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fus&action=click&contentCol
lection-us&region=stream&module=streamunit&version=latest&contentPlacement=43
&pgtype=sectionfront&_r=0 (Supreme Court to review whether lawyer's concession of
client's guilt of capital murder a permissible "strategic" decision).
31. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (stating that "strategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable").
32. Id.
33. Id. at 690-91; see GERSHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL ERROR, supra note 26, at 276 n.137.
34. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668; Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899
(2017).
35. See Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d
1089 (3d Cir. 1996).
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case, 36 or being unfamiliar with battered woman's syndrome.37 Nor may
an attorney ordinarily justify deficient performance by claiming that she
was simply following her client's wishes, 38 or that her client consented to
the trial strategy 39 without first evaluating other potential avenues and
advising the client of those options that may have greater merit.
Even the most egregious lawyering is not enough to trigger a reversal
on grounds of ineffectiveness. There also must be a showing by the
defendant that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. 40 This test is the same test used to determine whether a
prosecutor's suppression of favorable evidence is sufficiently prejudicial
to warrant a new trial. 4 1 As with the test for prosecutorial nondisclosure,
a "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. 42 This need to show prejudice further explains
the difficulty in remedying even the most outrageous examples of a
lawyer's failure to properly represent his client. Indeed, proving
prejudice may present a much more formidable challenge than proving
deficient performance. 43 As with prosecutorial misconduct, this is
typically the case when the evidence against the defendant is so strong
that there is no reasonable probability that the result would have been
different but for counsel's errors. 44 As a result, since it may be easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim for lack of prejudice than by
attempting to evaluate whether counsel's performance was legally
deficient, courts frequently bypass review of counsel's performance, or
give it a cursory treatment, and proceed directly to the issue of

36. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996).
37. People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 920 (Cal. App. 1992).
38. Summerlin v. Schirro, 427 F.3d 623, 638 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a capital
defendant's instructions to his attorney not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase of trial does not release counsel from its obligation to conduct an investigation into
potential mitigation evidence).
39. United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
strategy under which defense counsel concedes defendant's guilt on one count of a multicount indictment amounts to deficient performance if there is no showing that defendant
consented to the strategy).
40. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (holding
that the prejudice prong is satisfied if "there is a reasonable probability that at least one
juror would have struck a different balance").
41. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985).
42. Id. at 682.
43. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed.").
44. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 667.
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prejudice. 45 Counsel's deficient performance is thereby further insulated
from critical review.
Even given such broad appellate indulgence over very bad lawyering,
convictions are nevertheless reversed with increasing frequency based on
counsel's seriously deficient performance. The most common substantive
violations for reversal are the lawyer's failure to investigate potential
defenses, 46 failure to present crucial evidence, 47 opening the door to
damaging evidence, 48 failure to challenge the prosecutor's misconduct, 49
failure to impeach prosecution witnesses, 50 and failure to object to
inadmissible evidence. 51
Other violations are serious enough that courts do not even require a
showing of prejudice. 52 These cases suggest the lawyer's conduct was so
egregious it totally deprived the defendant of the assistance of counsel.5 3
Thus, convictions have been vacated because the defendant's lawyer was
absent from the courtroom for significant parts of the trial, 54 was asleep
during substantial portions of the trial,5 5 or was so drunk or mentally
impaired that he could barely function as an attorney. 56

45. See Pryor v. Norris, 103 F.3d 710, 713 (8th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep't
of Corr., 100 F.3d 750, 760 (10th Cir. 1996).
46. See Phillips v. White, 851 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2017); Hardy v. Chappell, 849 F.3d
803 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Arny, 831 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2016); Blackmon v.
Williams, 823 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 2016); Cooper v. United States, 660 F. App'x 730 (11th
Cir. 2016).
47. See United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Reddy v. Kelly, 657 F.
App'x 531 (6th Cir. 2016); Liao v. Junios, 817 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 2016).
48. See Rivas v. Fischer, 780 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 2015); Higgins v. Renico, 470 F.3d 624
(6th Cir. 2006); Berryman, 100 F.3d at 1089.
49. See Dubria v. Smith, 197 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1999); People v. Wright, 25 N.Y.3d 769
(2015); Cheeks v. State, 325 Ga. App. 367, 750 S.E.2d 753 (2013).
50. See Stouffer v. Reynolds, 214 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2000); Steinkuehler v. Meschner,
176 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 1999); Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316 (Del. 2015).
51. See Gardner v. United States, 680 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 2012); Tice v. Johnson, 647
F.3d 87 (4th Cir. 2011); Moore v. Czerniuak, 534 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2008).
52. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
53. Id. at 658-59 ("There are, however, circumstances that are so likely to prejudice
the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.").
54. See United States v. Roy, 761 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that
counsel's absence during the direct testimony of a prosecution witness violated the
defendant's right to counsel without need to show prejudice); Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257,
1263 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 806 (1987) (noting that absence of
counsel during taking of evidence is prejudicial per se).
55. See United States v. Ragin, 820 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2016); Burdine v. Johnson, 262
F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
56. See Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1993); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 634
F. Supp. 2412 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 409 (11th Cir. 1987).
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Just as the legal rules governing bad lawyering often insulate lawyers
from being held accountable for deficient conduct, so do the ethics rules
fail to address most instances of deficient courtroom advocacy. The rules
contain uplifting pronouncements about a lawyer acting "with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf."5 7 The rules command lawyers to
provide "competent representation,"5 8 to act with "reasonable diligence
and promptness,"59 and avoid a broad array of conflicts.60 But as with the
prosecutor's ethical responsibility to serve justice,61 the defense lawyer's
ethical charge is so vague and amorphous as to be virtually meaningless
as a guide or a deterrent.
II. SENDING BAD LAWYERS TO THE PENAL COLONY
The above discussion suggests many criminal defense lawyers under
our current regime sometimes get chastised by courts but apparently are
allowed to continue to provide grossly incompetent representation with
impunity and with no accountability. Given this unfortunate state of
affairs, it struck me that the invitation to think about disruptive
innovations might include departures from conventional norms of
attorney discipline in order to remove very bad lawyers from the system,
instill in good lawyers who have made mistakes an enhanced ethos
toward representing clients with skill and integrity, and restore the
public's confidence that the criminal justice system will not tolerate bad
lawyers.
So, the idea of sending bad lawyers to Kafka's Penal Colony was born.
At the very least, the Penal Colony would afford these lawyers a semimystical experience of reflection, repentance, and reform, perhaps in the
form of a specialized Continuing Legal Education program for "Lawyer
Renewal." It seems to me to be a disruptive innovation that might make
a difference.
Nor was I put off by obvious challenges of implementation. Admittedly,
the legal basis for this proposal is problematic. But legislation could be
enacted (and the ethics rules amended) to articulate the procedures by
which certain lawyers-most likely the worst of the worst-would be
committed to the Colony; the course of study, training, and soulful
enrichment required for successful completion of the program; and the
planned reintegration of these lawyers back into the system with varying
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

MODEL RULES
MODEL RULES
MODEL RULES
MODELRULES
MODEL RULES

OF
OF
OF
OF
OF

PROF'L CONDUCT r.
PROF'L CONDUCT r.
PROF'L CONDUCT r.
PROF'L CONDUCTr.
PROF'L CONDUCT r.

1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 1983).
1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
1.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
1.7, 1.8 (AM. BARASS'N 1983).
3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
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degrees of structured reassimilation. There could be a probationary
period of uncertain length, depending on the lawyer's performance.
Of course, there would need to be several adjustments to the kind of
Penal Colony that Kafka envisaged. I probably would not press for
Kafka's elaborate torture machine for the lawyers, 62 or the carving of the
words "Be Just"6 3 -or,

in this case, "Be a Better Lawyer"-on their

bodies. Nor would I support the execution of any lawyer, which is the
actual fate of persons condemned to Kafka's facility. But with these
caveats aside, I can foresee an experience for a lawyer in my imagined
Penal Colony for Bad Lawyers similar to the quasi-religious epiphany
experienced by condemned persons in Kafka's Penal Colony.
III. CONCLUSION

Disruptive innovations can take various forms. Forcing bad lawyers to
serve time in a rehabilitation facility is admittedly bizarre. However,
bizarre things are happening all the time. And while my proposal may be
absurd-admittedly "Kafkaesque"-it is provocative. The more
interesting question is why I have not proposed a similar innovation for
bad prosecutors. The answer is simple. Bad defense lawyers are capable
of reform and renewal into good lawyers. Bad prosecutors probably are
not, and no amount of forced reflection and retraining will make a
difference.

62. See KAFKA, Penal Colony, supra note 22, at 99-109.
63. Id. at 119.

